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The notion that the contemporary global order is somewhat 
‘in flux’ has been popular among scholars and policymakers 
for well over a decade. Proponents of the idea of an ongoing 
power shift point at the relative decline of Western players 
such as the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) 
vis-à-vis emerging actors such as China, whose growing 
(especially economic) clout has been increasingly matched 
with demands for greater political sway in global 
governance. Not all agree with the ‘decline of the West – 
rise of the rest’ rhetoric, arguing that global power goes far 
beyond economic indicators. Nevertheless, following the 
rather brief post-1989 unipolar phase, global politics have 
undeniably been witnessing significant shifts, with new 
actors emerging on the international stage and novel policy 
challenges (and ways to respond to them) gaining ground on 
key players’ agendas. In particular, so-called ‘global 
perspectives’ are on the rise, emphasising interdependence, 
the need for planetary awareness and coordinated 
responses on issues pertaining to global public goods. 
Global public goods are non-excludable and non-rival in 
consumption and their benefits reach across borders, 
generations and population groups, for example climate 
stability, peace and security, and to some extent also the 
multilateral trading system.   
 
In this light, interdependence is no longer a merely 
descriptive functional feature of the global system, but its 
management represents a requirement that all actors 
aspiring to play a leading role within that system will have 
to meet. Given their overall economic, political and security 
primacy, it is crucial to have a closer look at the actors 
constituting the three corners of what can be referred to as 
a ‘global triangle’ – the US, China, and the EU. This policy 
brief analyses their current stances towards the 
aforementioned fluidity of the status quo in the areas of 
trade, foreign and security policy and climate change. While 
discussing the strategic environment first from the 
perspectives of two of the corners of the triangle, the US and 
China, emphasis in this policy brief is then placed on the 
third corner, the EU and its actual and potential (re)actions.  
 
The policy brief argues that those actors with a flexible 
approach to the evolving order are likely to be more 
effective as global leaders than those veering towards a less 
reformist attitude. While the US seems to belong to the 
latter camp, China appears to have embraced a degree of 
flexibility. For the EU, pragmatic adaptability is also crucial 
in order to exploit the potential of co-leadership with other 
players, which in a variety of domains emerges as the best 
scenario to take advantage of the increased global 
flexibility. While the strategic path is clear, less so is the 
ability of the EU to successfully embark on it. 
Executive Summary 
> A changing global order requires actors aiming at 
global leadership to develop a flexible foreign policy 
approach to interdependence. 
> Given their material pre-eminence, it is particularly 
crucial to analyse how the US, China and the EU 
have been responding to the fluidity of the global 
system. 
> The structural primacy of the United States makes 
it hostile to reforming global governance, and the 
current Administration is veering towards a more 
withdrawn, unilateral approach to global issues 
which risks creating a ‘power vacuum’. 
> China has been greatly stepping up its global 
engagement, displaying pragmatic flexibility and 
promoting reform via inclusive, ‘horizontal’ 
leadership on many issues. 
> The EU, despite internal constraints, has been 
making important steps forward towards strategic 
pragmatism, especially via its 2016 Global Strategy.  
> In light of US disengagement, the EU’s effectiveness 
and legitimacy as a global actor could greatly 
benefit from co-leadership with an increasingly 
proactive China in a number of domains, especially 
those pertaining to the sustainable management of 
the global commons. 
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Global politics and the Asia-Pacific side of the triangle: the 
US and China 
 
Structurally speaking, the notion of a ‘triangle’, composed of 
the US, the EU, and China and acting as a sort of global 
‘steering committee’ is rather misleading, given the lack of 
institutionalisation of the actual triangular relations between 
these actors. A US-EU-China summit is hardly foreseeable in 
the near future, and Washington, Brussels and Beijing 
overwhelmingly prefer to deal with each other bilaterally.  
 
Nevertheless, the combined relative weight of the three on a 
global scale makes this notion analytically useful, in that it 
underscores the importance of the three actors’ approach to 
global governance and of their outlook on its dynamism. As 
the analysis will clarify, there are significant differences 
between the three in terms of their role in the existing order 
(the status quo) and, consequently, in their respective 
openness to reform processes. Moreover, especially as far as 
the US is concerned, recent domestic political developments 
have added an extra layer of complexity to its stance on 
global governance. 
 
The United States: a retreating hegemon? 
 
The US is unquestionably the leading power within the 
current system. With regard to its structural power, which 
refers to the ability to shape the context in which relations 
between international actors play out, the US has been the 
main architect of the post-World War II order. It has heavily 
shaped virtually all the international regimes and institutions 
that – to this day – constitute the backbone of international 
economic and security relations. From the so-called Bretton 
Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank) to the world’s most powerful military alliance (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation), to what remains the most 
advanced attempt at establishing global governance (the 
United Nations), the US remains a steering power and de 
facto veto player in all. 
 
In this light, structural power has certainly helped the US 
become the – until very recently – unrivalled global hegemon, 
at least in security terms. The US remains the world’s largest 
national economy (at least in nominal terms), the top military 
superpower, and a leading innovator – all of which suggests 
that its primacy is not going to be threatened in the short 
term.  
 
This structural and material pre-eminence has made the US 
arguably the strongest upholder of the status quo, 
unsurprisingly rather unwilling to display the kind of reformist 
flexibility that is typical of those who do not enjoy such a 
hegemonic position. As this status quo is changing, new 
actors, who have undoubtedly benefitted from the dynamic 
international economic environment promoted by US-led 
globalisation, are emerging, and have been voicing 
increasingly strong reformist demands to see their growing 
material weight recognised also at the structural level. This 
challenges the US-led order and, should the US fail to adjust 
to those demands, might also lead it to become a ‘victim of 
its own success’. 
 
Recent developments in US politics and policies do not bode 
particularly well for a more open approach to reform in any 
of the three main domains analysed here. While the actual 
impact of the new Administration remains to be seen, Donald 
Trump’s electoral success relied heavily on anti-globalisation 
rhetoric, shared to a certain extent even by some of his rivals, 
including Hillary Clinton, who criticised the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and came out against the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), her own brainchild during her 
previous tenure as Secretary of State. In US trade policy, 
‘America First’-based self-reliance has arguably been flaunted 
more aggressively than in any other domain. During the 
campaign, Trump repeatedly referred to China and its soaring 
inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as an ‘existential 
threat’ for the US economy. The tone may have softened a 
bit, but tensions with Beijing remain high and trade wars are 
not implausible. What is more, the US Administration is far 
from united on how to deal with global governance issues, 
with senior officials split in various factions ranging from 
‘hardcore nationalist’ to more ‘globalist’ stances, thereby 
further reducing the predictability and credibility of an 
already ‘impulsive’ government. Cleavages are also present 
between the Trump administration and Congressional 
Republicans on key issues such as sanctions against Russia, 
stance vis-à-vis NATO, and trade policy itself. Moreover, as far 
as foreign and security policy is concerned, Trump’s overall 
approach to international relations appears strongly 
transactional, emphasising ‘zero-sum’, unilateral views that 
stand in stark contrast with the multilateral cooperation 
advocated by most other major players, including China and 
the EU. With regard to climate change, large swathes of the 
current US Administration hold ‘sceptical’ views that are 
opposed to the global scientific consensus, upheld by both 
China and the EU. Dramatic confirmation of this dangerously 
divergent approach came on 1 June 2017, when Trump 
announced the American retreat from the milestone 2015 
Paris Agreement. This has led to a de facto silencing of the 
issue in US-China relations, while Washington’s European 
partners have made it clear that their commitment to 
implementing the Agreement will not waver. 
 
In light of these developments, the US seems to be heading 
towards an overall more ‘withdrawn’ approach to global 
affairs, which in turn could create what some commentators 
have aptly defined a ‘power vacuum’. This is likely to open up 
greater room for action for other international actors and 
(especially US) sub-national actors in an increasing number of 
domains, especially non-traditional (and therefore less 
institutionalised) ones related to culture, innovation and the 
sustainable management of the global commons.  
 
Before moving on to analysing the situation of the two other 
sides of the global triangle, however, a caveat is in order. In 
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spite of Trump’s vocal anti-multilateralism, most recently 
underscored by the withdrawal from the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), US presence in 
key global governance regimes and bodies is and will remain 
very strong in the near future, hence making major upheavals 
unlikely in the short to medium term. Washington might be 
trying to loosen the global ties it has more than anyone 
helped create, but interdependence has reached such depths 
that it will be very difficult and reckless – even for the most 
radical of governments – to try and abruptly sever those ties 
without appropriate contingency plans. 
 
China: A doctrinal shift towards pragmatic engagement    
 
China’s astonishing economic success since the beginning of 
the reforms in the late 1970s has led it to become the world’s 
second largest economy by nominal GDP. Since the 2008 
global financial crisis, China has been the largest contributor 
to world growth, accounting for nearly 39 percent in 2016 
despite an overall slower GDP growth rate (Roach 2016). Such 
impressive figures have made its ‘rise’ a true buzzword 
among scholars and experts, heatedly debating whether 
Beijing is (and will be) an upholder, a reformer, or a 
threatening spoiler of the current framework of global 
governance. 
 
China’s approach to the ‘global system’ has significantly 
changed since the Deng Xiaoping era. While earlier Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) generations tended to favour Deng’s 
‘low-lying’ approach to global governance, based on the low-
profile pursuit of almost exclusively economic goals, the new 
leadership has been promoting a very different approach, 
hinging on the ever-growing awareness of China’s resources 
and confidence in its global standing. Already during the 
presidency of Hu Jintao, but especially since Xi Jinping took 
power, China’s international engagement strategy has shifted 
towards ‘striving for achievement’. It thereby emphasises its 
willingness to play a much more visible role as a global 
‘responsible stakeholder’. While Beijing remains adamant 
about its unique ‘dual identity’ as a global power and a (still) 
developing country, its soaring engagement – not only 
bilateral but also multilateral – marks a true doctrinal shift.  
 
As a ‘responsible stakeholder’, China’s declared aim in most 
domains is not to spoil the status quo, but rather to integrate 
into it (self-co-optation) and, once gained credibility, to 
moderately reform it from the inside in a sustainable way. 
Succeeding at this requires remarkable flexibility, and 
Beijing’s track record so far is definitely promising in all three 
policy domains considered in this brief. 
 
With regard to trade policy, many of China’s largest partners, 
especially in the EU, have long been complaining about what 
they see as Beijing’s unfair practices, notably its double 
standards in outgoing versus incoming investment and issues 
pertaining to dumping and intellectual property rights. China 
has vowed to address these concerns, and has explicitly 
committed to developing global free trade and investment, 
supporting the World Trade Organisation and pursuing Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other trade-facilitating 
agreements within the framework of large-scale connectivity 
initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, hailed as 
‘inclusive’, ‘transparent’ and ‘win-win’ (Xi 2017). While the 
extent to which the West has actually successfully co-opted 
China into the existing liberal world trade order remains to be 
determined, Beijing’s cooperative and proactive engagement 
towards economic globalisation attests to its determination 
not to be seen as a disruptor. 
 
As for foreign and security policy, when looking at Beijing’s 
peacekeeping policy, for instance, it is evident how China has 
shown considerable adaptability to an originally very ‘alien’ 
concept. Even as ‘minimalist’ peacekeeping based on the so-
called Hammarskjöld principles of impartiality, neutrality and 
host country consent gave way, in the 1990s, to a much more 
‘proactive’ (and intrusive) approach hinging on 
peacebuilding, China’s commitment to UN-led operations 
continued to rise, in terms of both troops (China is the biggest 
contributor among the five permanent UN Security Council 
members) and financial resources. As mentioned above, this 
has been possible thanks to China’s ‘contextual strategic 
adaptation’: case-specific normative flexibility, characterised 
by the gradual relaxation of sovereignism towards greater 
interventionism aimed at fostering its image as a ‘responsible 
stakeholder’, which in turn allows it to deploy moderately 
reformist initiatives to pursue its interests without being 
perceived as a dangerous ‘spoiler’. 
 
Moreover, such flexibility also indicates China’s keen 
awareness of the changing global environment, which 
obviously extends beyond the security and economic realms. 
Along these lines, China is rapidly becoming a trailblazer in 
the field of climate change and sustainable development, at 
both the domestic and the global level. Governance-wise, 
Beijing’s support was vital for the successful adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, but its commitment to tackle this issue 
extends far beyond it. In 2016, China invested $87.8bn in 
renewable energy – the highest amount in the world (the EU 
invested $70.9bn, and the US $58.6bn)(Pyper 2017) –, and 
spent a record $32bn on renewable projects abroad. In 2017, 
it is set to implement the world’s largest emissions trading 
system which, if successful, will create major worldwide 
incentives. Moreover, Beijing has been strengthening its 
influence within several multilateral development banks to 
ensure better funding for ‘greener’ transitions in various 
developing countries (Stern 2017). 
 
All this engagement does not stem from disinterested 
goodwill: the Chinese regime has become increasingly 
dependent on so-called performance legitimacy, and its very 
survival is linked to its ability to deliver sustainable 
development to its own people. Given China’s burgeoning 
global profile, this performance has come to include its 
international policies, hence helping explain Beijing’s 
described doctrinal shift (Zhu 2011). 
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However, even in areas such as green development, China 
has so far been in many ways reluctant to assume outright 
global leadership, albeit certainly more on paper than in 
practice. As evident in most of its high-profile endeavours, 
such as the Eurasian connectivity behemoth known as the 
Belt and Road Initiative, China prefers a more ‘horizontal’ 
style of engagement, consistent with the idea that effective 
governance in an era of interdependence benefits more from 
initiatives by ‘good classmates’ than instructions from 
‘enlightened teachers’ (as the US has often portrayed itself). 
 
The EU corner of the ‘triangle’: towards co-leadership? 
 
With the US seemingly becoming a withdrawn upholder of 
the status quo, and China gradually embracing flexible and 
pragmatic engagement, what role is there for the EU to play 
in today’s fluid global political arena? 
 
Based on most key indicators, the EU is unquestionably an 
economic giant. It accounts for almost 23 percent of global 
GDP, and is the world’s leader in FDI (both inward and 
outward) and trade in goods and commercial services. Being 
a trade powerhouse, however, does not come hand-in-hand 
with comparable political and military clout. The EU clearly 
exhibits deficits in this regard compared to both China and 
the US. 
 
Full-fledged, effective ‘actorness’ in the international system 
requires a high degree of (internal) coherence and 
consistency as well as significant capabilities. This has so far 
proven to be a major challenge for the EU, whose sui generis, 
multi-layered nature considerably hinders its ability to 
aggregate the foreign policy interests of all its components 
(member states, institutions…) to devise and implement 
effective policies, especially considering how many ‘external’ 
domains remain quite strictly intergovernmental. Adding to 
this already complex picture, EU actors have exhibited a 
rather worrying lack of long-term strategic vision, often 
compounded by normative rigidity with regard to many of the 
EU’s values-based policies, which are patently ill-suited to the 
aforementioned flexible evolution of global governance. 
Nevertheless, EU leaders and institutions have been showing 
increasing awareness of the missed opportunities caused by 
these gaps, and the institutional reforms of the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty and broader policy/strategy documents and initiatives 
have been trying to address them. Over the past few years, 
steps forward have been made in all three policy domains 
discussed in this policy brief. 
 
With regard to trade policy, the EU has been displaying 
significant adaptability, reframing its trade strategy along 
pragmatic geo-economic lines. So as not to compromise its 
privileged position as the world’s largest market, the EU has 
in the past decade been further broadening and deepening 
its trade agenda and diversifying its trade partners. It has 
started to negotiate a number of plurilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements (from the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership to the FTA with Japan), and it has 
strengthened its emphasis on enforcing reciprocity and other 
commitments (especially vis-à-vis China) as well as on using 
its economic clout to pursue normative goals. The defensive 
(even ‘destructive’) approach of the new US Administration, 
together with China’s more positive globalisation discourse, 
might offer the EU a chance to take on an even more 
prominent role on the global trade stage. This is provided that 
Brussels and Beijing manage to reduce the many trade-
related frictions that currently constitute the biggest 
hindrance to comprehensive bilateral cooperation, from anti-
dumping to China’s outbound/inbound investment bias, to 
granting it Market Economy Status in the WTO framework.  
 
As far as foreign and security policy is concerned, the 2016 EU 
Global Strategy (EUGS) is – at least on paper – by far the most 
advanced effort, introducing a wide-ranging strategic 
overhaul based on the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’, 
which seeks to compound the EU’s idealistic aspirations with 
a ‘realistic assessment of the current strategic environment’. 
The document explicitly calls for greater flexibility in EU 
policymaking, and repeatedly mentions the need to scale up 
its engagement in Asia, hence displaying a strong discursive 
drive towards the much-needed adaptability. In practice, it 
will be hard to actually reform EU foreign policy along more 
coherent and consistent pragmatic lines, especially 
considering how EU member states’ foreign policy concepts 
vary quite significantly (from the emphasis on values to the 
role attributed to the supranational level). Yet, the EUGS 
marks definitely a step in the right direction if the EU is to 
enhance its role in the global governance arena. 
Implementing the new strategy is all the more important 
when considering that, while the EU remains the obviously 
least internally consistent actor of the triangle, current trends 
in global politics and governance might provide it with 
unprecedented opportunities to truly step up its role as a 
global (co-)leader. For instance, forced by its lack of hard 
military power and by recent geopolitical developments in its 
vicinity, the EU has become one of the most experienced 
global players when it comes to addressing so-called non-
traditional security issues: challenges to the survival and well-
being of peoples and states arising mainly out of non-military 
sources, such as health hazards, resource depletion, and 
migration. As the global agenda is increasingly crowded with 
non-traditional threats, this bodes well for the EU’s 
engagement and potential influence.  
 
As for climate change, the EU has long been regarded as a 
leader in environmental policies, having launched the world’s 
first major carbon market (the 2005 Emissions Trading 
System, ETS) and consistently providing substantial funding 
to develop sustainable technologies. On top of this, one of its 
core missions is to take a leading role in international 
negotiations on climate change, and recent developments 
have shown the determination of EU leaders not to yield to 
the US sceptical backflip.  
 
While transatlantic ties are and will remain crucial, the EU has 
not been oblivious to Washington’s increasingly withdrawn 
5 
 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
© Francesco S. Montesano 
CEPOB # 10.17 - Nov mber 2017 
 
and self-centred approach to global governance. As aptly put 
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel after the last G-7 
Summit, Europe is aware that it ‘must take its fate into its own 
hands’, thereby signalling a willingness to look past its 
traditional ally and seek other partners to pursue its global 
agenda. In this regard, China’s new global engagement could 
provide a significant opportunity. Despite their political 
divergences, the EU and China have both shown openness to 
a flexible approach to global governance, and are therefore 
potentially well-placed to provide some form of co-leadership 
in a number of domains to help build and strengthen a 
reformed order (Chen 2016). Both Brussels and Beijing are 
capable of playing a leading role in addressing non-traditional 
issues and have been intensifying their concerted efforts, 
especially in fields such as climate change. In a recent planned 
joint communiqué leaked days before Trump’s 
announcement that the US was walking out of the Paris 
Agreement, the EU and China vowed to deepen their 
cooperation, confirming their commitment to the Paris 
Agreement and effectively presenting themselves as the only 
viable diplomatic alternative to deal with such a critical issue 
(Mathiesen 2017).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU is well-positioned to improve its standing in a 
changing global system, benefitting from growing global 
interdependence and the rise of both non-traditional actors 
and issues. In addition to being a post-national player itself, 
the EU is already a trailblazer in a variety of new policy areas 
and approaches, especially with regard to the management 
of global public goods, and has shown increasing strategic 
flexibility in addressing changes in global governance in trade, 
foreign and security policy and climate change.  
 
The analysis of the current dynamics within the global 
triangle has shown that, in light of the growing US 
unilateralism, co-leadership with an increasingly proactive 
and ‘engaged’ China on ‘soft’ issues not directly related to 
‘hard’ power (and therefore not explicitly encroaching on US 
interests) would not only provide the EU with greater access 
to Beijing’s burgeoning resources. It would also help it 
establish itself as a more legitimate leader on the global 
stage, going beyond all-Western neoliberal transatlanticism 
towards a more pragmatic and inclusive approach, which 
would prove the EU’s ‘touch’ with current developments in 
international relations and therefore greatly boost its image 
as a truly global player. Internal obstacles to global 
‘actorness’ remain challenging, but the external context may 
be rather favourable for the EU to achieve just that. 
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